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Yet,  it  is  glaring  to  even  the  casual  observer  that  public  infrastructure  is  very  different  in 
different  countries.   How does public  infrastructure  affect private  sector  inventory  levels?    I 




of  infrastructure  changes.    I  address  that using  instrumental  variables  consisting  of physical 
attributes  of  countries—such  as  their  elevation,  whether  they  are  land‐locked,  their  mean 








Yet,  it  is  glaring  to  even  the  casual  observer  that  public  infrastructure  is  very  different  in 
different countries.  How does public infrastructure affect private sector inventory levels? 







goods  sold)  versus  infrastructure,  measured  with  the  ratio  of  road  length  to  total  area.  




store  in Singapore does not seem  to be any smaller  than  that of  the Carrefour  in Johor Bahru.  
Would  a  rigorous  analysis  support  the Guasch  and Kogan  proposition,  or  Figure  1  and  the 
                                                     





hypothesis of  interest,  that private firm‐level  inventory substitutes  for public  infrastructure.    I 
shall call this the “substitution hypothesis.”  I further consider alternative hypotheses about the 
relationship  between  infrastructure  and  inventory,  which  I  summarize  in  Table  1.    One 
competing view is that we might observe low inventory with better infrastructure, not because 
of  substitution,  but  because  of  reverse  causality.    In  this  interpretation,  low  inventory  levels 
could  be  an  indication  of  firm  quality  (e.g.,  Lai  (2005)).    Countries  with  low  firm‐level 
inventories  have  better,  more  profitable  firms  that  pay  more  taxes.    Better  public  finances 
translate  to  better  infrastructure,  holding  factors  like  government  and  institutions  constant.  
Thus,  any  purported  evidence  for  the  substitution  hypothesis must  rule  out  this  alternative 
“public finance hypothesis.” 
Another  competing view  is  concerned not with  reverse  causality, but with  the possibility 
that the relationship between infrastructure and inventory is spurious altogether.   Specifically, 
infrastructure and inventory can both increase with anticipated GDP growth.  If one rises faster 
than  the other, we might observe a (spurious) substitution between  them.    I shall call  this  the 
“co‐determination hypothesis.” 
In  section  2,  I describe  a dataset  to  test  the  substitution hypothesis  and  these  competing 
hypotheses.   The dataset contains  information for 4,268 unique retail firms  in 60 countries, for 
the period 1983 through 2004.  I study retail firms because these hold large inventories as part of 
their  regular  course  of  business.    Even  in  the  U.S.,  where  infrastructure  is  developed  and 
inventory levels are presumably lower, the median retailer holds as much as 20% of their cost of 
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goods  sold  as  inventory  (see  analysis  later).   At  the  country  level,  retailers  also  hold much 
inventory.    For  example, U.S.  retailers  hold  $467  billion  in  inventories  in November  2005,  a 
shade higher than the $466 billion held by manufacturers (Commerce (2006)). 
In  section  3,  I  describe  the  empirical  strategy.    The  centerpiece  of  the  empirics  is  in 
identifying the exogenous component of  infrastructure.   To do that, I use several  instrumental 
variables—such  as  the  elevation  of  a  country,  and  information  on  whether  a  country  is 
landlocked or  is an  island—which  I argue serve  the  identification purpose.    I also control  for 
GDP growth, which  the  co‐determination hypothesis argues  is  the underlying driver of both 
infrastructure and inventory.  If, after controlling for GDP growth (and other relevant factors), 
exogenous  infrastructure  is still not negatively correlated with  inventory,  then  I can reject  the 
substitution hypothesis.  This baseline strategy is bolstered with many robustness analyses. 
In  section 4,  I  report  the key  result  that  there  is evidence  consistent with  the  substitution 




In  section  5,  I  find  that  the  baseline  result  is  robust  to many  sensitivity  analyses.   These 
include analyses that expand the measures of infrastructure (from  just roads in the baseline to 
airports  and  container  ports),  vary  the  dataset  (from  focusing  on  small  countries  with 





might  find  that utilization  increases “too much” with  improved  infrastructure,  so  that at  the 
firm level, the net result is that improved infrastructure does not improve operating conditions 
(even  though  at  the  country  level,  welfare  might  be  improved  with  more  firms  and  more 
activity).  I do not find this to be the case empirically.  Another contingency is at the firm level.  I 
find  that  firms  with  greater  agency  problems—measured  using  the  proportion  of  minority 
interest—exhibit less reduction in inventory with improved infrastructure. 
Finally,  in section 7,  I conclude with some  implications.    I also  interpret what  this  finding 






To sum up this  introduction, this paper makes two contributions to the  literature.   First,  it 
addresses a vital question at the interface of operations management and public policy.  Given 
the astonishing magnitude of public  infrastructure  investments,  it  is  important  to clarify  their 
benefits, one of which  is purported  to be  improved  inventory management at  the  firm  level.  
Second, the paper also makes a modest empirical contribution, using large‐scale econometrics in 
a multi‐country setting with physical country characteristics as instrumental variables. 






narrower  definition  in  this  paper:  infrastructure  includes  the  basic  facilities,  services,  and 
installations  typically built and operated by governments that could reduce  logistics costs, supply 
lead  times,  or  demand  volatilities.   Under  this  definition,  I  am  primarily  referring  to  roads, 
railways, ports, and airports.   I exclude utilities  like water and power.   Importantly, I exclude 
communications  infrastructure  like  phone  networks,  because  these  are  mostly  built  and 




The  baseline  I  investigate  is  the  “substitution  hypothesis”  described  in  the  introduction.  
Guasch  and Kogan  (2004)  use  a  standard  news‐vendor  formulation  to  argue  that more  and 
better  infrastructure  decreases  transit  time,  which  in  turn  reduces  inventory  requirement.  
Another  possibility  is  that  consumers  can  reduce  the  need  to  bulk‐purchase.    Furthermore, 
infrastructure  can  enlarge  market  catchment  and  therefore  volume,  allowing  retailers  to 
produce more accurate  forecasts and again decrease  inventory needs.   Larger catchment may 
also  introduce  more  competition,  forcing  firms  to  become  more  efficient  at  inventory 
management.    There  is  some  empirical  evidence  to  support  these  arguments.    Chikan  and 
Whybark  (1990)  survey  firms  in  South  Korea,  China,  Western  Europe  and  Hungary  and 
conclude  that more  industrialized  countries with  better  infrastructure  have  lower  inventory.  
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Goonatilake (1990) argues that firms  in developing countries are more  likely to operate  in  less 
competitive  environments  and  therefore  have  less  incentive  to  manage  inventory  tightly.  
However, most of these papers use surveys or cases (surveys are  in Prasad and Babbar (2000) 
and Prasad, et al.  (2001),  rather  than  the  large‐scale econometric approach  in  this paper. One 
paper  that does  take an  econometric  approach  is Guasch  and Kogan  (2004).   However,  their 
result  is  mixed:  they  find  that  infrastructure  reduces  inventory  only  for  raw  materials,  not 
aggregate inventory, work‐in‐progress, or finished goods.   Also, they address inventory at the 
industry  level,  rather  than  the  firm‐level  that  is  the  focus  of  this  paper.    Furthermore,  they 
compare  mostly  the  U.S.  and  only  Latin  American  countries.    Because  many  of  these  are 
geographically  expansive  countries  with  uneven  infrastructure  development  in  say,  urban 




indirectly  be  driving  infrastructure.    This  endogeneity  argument  is  very  similar  to  a  very 
extensive parallel  literature  in  industrial organization, where the question  is whether  industry 
structure  determines  firm  performance  (e.g.,  Porter  (1980))  or  firm  performance  determines 
industry structure (e.g., Demsetz (1973)).  The latter’s story is that high‐performing firms grows 
to dominate their industries, so it would be wrong to attribute firm performance to “favorable” 
industry structures  (fewer competitors).   The analogous argument here  is  that  lean  inventory 
could be a manifestation of  firm performance  (e.g., Chen, et al.  (2005), Gaur, et al.  (1999), Lai 
(2005)).    Better,  more  profitable  firms  contribute  more  to  taxes  and  therefore  better 
  7
infrastructure,  holding  other  factors  like  the  quality  of  government  and  budget  allocations 
constant. 
Apart  from  “public  finance,”  there  is  another  potential  source  of  endogeneity  in  the 
substitution  hypothesis.    Here,  a  competing  “co‐determination  hypothesis”  is  that  the 
relationship between inventory and infrastructure could be spurious, if both are determined by 
other  factors.    A  candidate  for  this  third  factor  is  expected  GDP  growth.    When  growth  is 
anticipated,  both  private  firms  stock  up  inventory  and  public  policy  makers  invest  in 
infrastructure  (e.g., Glaeser, et al.  (2004)).   GDP growth may not be  the only  third  factor.   For 
example, Chikan  and Whybark  (1990)  suggest  that  indigenous  and  cultural  factors  in  South 
Korea,  China,  Hungary,  and  Western  Europe  lead  to  different  inventory  practices  in  these 
places.    Such  factors  could  also  determine  investments  in  infrastructure,  perhaps  through 
channels such as the quality of government (e.g., La Porta, et al. (1999b)).  I emphasize that the 












of  the  road  system disproportionately,  in  a network  effect, but  further  increase  in utilization 
causes  traffic  jams  –  e.g.,  the  new Ring Expressway  in Bangkok,  and  empirical  evidence  for 
induced traffic in Boarnet and Chalermpong (2000) and the survey in there.2 
Another  contingency  is at  the  firm  level.    In a  firm where management  is divorced  from 
ownership,  such  as  the  classic  Berle  and Means  (1932)  corporation  (see  also  La  Porta,  et  al. 
(1999a)),  there  could  be  agency  problems.    In  such  firms,  shareholders  cannot  evaluate 
management’s hidden  and  costly  (to management)  action  to  keep  inventory  lean, given  that 
inventory has only a noisy correlation with observable measures of management quality such as 
financial performance  (e.g., Chen, et al.  (2005), Lai  (2005), Netessine and Roumiantsev  (2005)).  
Therefore,  management  consistently  under‐invests  in  keeping  inventory  lean  even  when 






analysis,  so  I  assemble  my  dataset  from  a  number  of  sources.    The  main  one  is  Osiris,  an 
                                                     





World’Vest Base, Multex, KIS  (Korea  Information  Service), Teikoku  of  Japan,  and Huaxia  of 
China.  It covers 38,000 listed and major unlisted and delisted companies worldwide, 30,000 of 
which are non‐US companies.   A particularly  important  feature of  the dataset  is  that  there  is 
standardization  across  countries.    Standardization  is  done  on  one  of  three  formats:  Anglo, 
Continental, and Hybrid.  I choose Anglo, since the majority of the countries fit into this without 
standardization).   It also includes standardizing values in U.S. currency (but as I argue below, 
this  is  not  important  anyway  because  I  mostly  use  ratios).    I  supplement  this  with 
COMPUSTAT’s  Global  Vantage,  both  to  check  that  the  comprehensiveness  of  the  Osiris 
integrated  dataset  (COMPUSTAT  turns  out  to  be  largely  a  subset  of  Osiris)  and  to  obtain 
important  information  on  accounting  conventions  each  firm  adopts.    From  the  combined 
dataset,  I  extract  only  those  in  retail  (NAICS  2000  code  44  through  45).    For  a  sense  of  the 
coverage of  the dataset, COMPUSTAT  claims  that  it  covers “over 90% of  the worldʹs market 
capitalization,  including  coverage of over 96% of European market  capitalization and 88% of 
Asian market capitalization.” 
The dataset  is summarized  in Table 2. Panel  (a) shows  the  firm‐year observations.   Given 
that the firms are retailers, it is not surprising that most of the inventories are “finished goods” 
rather than raw materials or work‐in‐progress (WIP).  Therefore, in the rest of this paper, I focus 
on  aggregate  inventory  (separate  estimations  using  only  finished  goods  inventory  produce 
qualitatively  the  same  results  and  are  not  reported).    Panel  (b)  shows  the  distribution  by 
country.   Many  countries  have  very  few  observations  per  year.    In  the  analyses,  I  therefore 
conduct analyses with and without  these  (usually small) countries.    I  report  results  including 
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these countries, since  the results are qualitatively  the same.    In  the unreported sub‐samples,  I 
use  thresholds of  50  and  100 minimum number of observations.   To guard  against potential 
sample  selection  bias  arising  from  these  culls,  I  further  correct  them  using  a  Heckman 






that affects numerator and denominator  in  the same way.   This  is  the approach  I  take  in our 
baseline analyses.   Second,  in robustness checks, I marshal detailed  information about various 
conventions our firms take and conduct analyses for sub‐samples in which firm‐years have the 
same conventions. Panels (c), (d), (e), and (f) show the listing status (important since many firms 
in  emerging markets  are  private),  cost  accounting methods,  inventory  accounting  treatment, 
and  standards  adopted  in  the  firm‐years.    These  are  used  to  construct  sub‐samples  for 
robustness tests, described later. 
The rest of the panels show country characteristics.  In panel (g), I summarize country‐year 
observations  in a dataset  that  is  joined with  the  firm‐year dataset  for analysis.   This country‐
year information is from the World Bank, who in turn obtained the information from national 
statistical  agencies  around  the  world.    Consistency  is  ensured  to  a  reasonable  extent.    For 
example,  all  agencies  compile  data  according  to  at  least  the  1968  SNA  (System  of National 
Accounts), and more are adopting the 1993 SNA.  Furthermore, “data are shown for economies 
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where LOGINVENTORYcif,t+1  is  the aggregate  inventory  for  firm  f  in country  c  in year  t+1, 
scaled by contemporaneous cost of goods sold, LOGINFRASTRUCTUREcift is a measure of some 
element  of  country  c’s  infrastructure  in  year  t  scaled  by  the  country’s  area,  and 
LOGGDPGROWTHct  a measure of country c’s GDP growth  in year t.. Fcift and Cct are vectors of 
firm and country control variables, FIRMf are firm effects, and εft is assumed to be white noise.  
The  idea  is  that,  after  all  the  controls, what  is  left  in  LOGINFRASTRUCTUREct  affects  next‐
period LOGINVENTORYcif,t+1.   Under  the  substitution hypothesis, LOGINFRASTRUCTUREct  is 
negatively  signed,  while  under  the  public  finance  hypothesis,  it  is  not,  since  next‐period 
inventory  should  not  affect  previous‐period  infrastructure.    Importantly,  the  substitution 
hypothesis  predicts  that  LOGINFRASTRUCTUREct  is  negatively  signed  even  with 
LOGGDPGROWTHct on  the  right hand  side, while  the  co‐determination hypothesis  says  that 
including LOGGDPGROWTHct will  render LOGINFRASTRUCTUREct  statistically  insignificant.  
Furthermore,  under  co‐determination,  LOGGDPGROWTHct  is  predicted  to  have  a  significant 
coefficient, since it is supposed to correlate with inventory. 
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I measure LOGINFRASTRUCTUREct on  several dimensions:  road  length, portion of  roads 
paved,  railway  length,  container  port  and  airport  facilities.    However,  I  am  able  to  obtain 




the supply of  infrastructure, but also  its demand, which  is correlated with LOGINVENTORY.   
Therefore,  I  consider  these measured  with  error  so  I  also  estimate  the  baseline model  with 
instrumental variables (see later). 
The  LOGINFRASTRUCTUREct  measures  are  scaled  in  two  alternate  ways:  GDP  and 




example,  for a Chinese  firm  in Shanghai,  the average  infrastructure  for China  is not  relevant 
unless  the  firm  operates  in  all parts  of China.   Therefore, my  baseline dataset will  focus  on 
geographically small countries (total area  less than 400,000 square km) or countries with well‐
developed  infrastructure  (GDP per  capita at US$20,000 or above, at purchasing power parity 





The  firm  controls  Fcft  include  gross  margin,  capital  intensity,  and  a  measure  of  “sales 
surprise.”   Gaur, et al.  (2005) show  that  these explain 97.2% of  the  inventory variance among 
retail firms  in the U.S.   One difference  is that I have only a very short time period to measure 
sales surprise (which they measure using Holt’s exponential smoothing method), so I use sales 
growth as a proxy.  Perhaps the important argument for why this is less relevant here is that it 
is  hard  to  imagine  that  sales  surprise  could  be  correlated  with  LOGINFRASTRUCTUREct.  
Indeed, the correlation between my proxy (sales growth) and LOGROADS is 0.01., close to zero. 
For  the  country  controls Cct  ,  I  include  inflation  and  interest  rates,  following Chen,  et  al. 
(2005).    They  also  have  GDP  growth,  which  is  a  variable  of  interest  here  under  the  “co‐
determination hypothesis.”  Therefore, this is also included as a regressor, as we will see.  I also 
add  LOGPHONE  (log  of  the  number  of  fixed  line  and  mobile  phone  subscribers  per  1,000 




approach.   Specifically,  I  instrument LOGINFRASTRUCTUREct using  the exogenous variables: 
(1) the country’s total area, (2) whether the country is landlocked, (3) whether it is an island, (4) 
its  mean  elevation,  (5)  the  shortest  air  distance  from  its  capital  to  New  York,  Tokyo,  or 





that  at  coastal  elevation  (the  supporting  literature  is  extensive;  see,  for  example, U.S.  Forest 
Service,  (2003)).    I also confirm  the  intuition with an expert  in civil engineering  familiar with 
geographic conditions in a variety of developed and emerging nations in Asia3. 
Because  the  instruments are  time‐invariant country characteristics,  the model  is as before, 
but without the firm fixed effects: 
LOGINVENTORYcif,t+1 = LOGINFRASTRUCTUREct + LOGGDPGROWTHct + Fcift + Cct + εcift , 
Econometrically,  the  instrumental  variables  are  satisfactory  in  their  correlation  with  the 
potentially  endogenous  variables.    Table  3  shows  that  each  endogenous  variable  is  highly 
correlated with  at  least  one  instrumental  variable.    I  cannot  reject  the  null  of  substitution  if 
LOGINFRASTRUCTUREct  still  has  a  negative  coefficient  after  partialing  out  potential 
endogeneity  with  the  instrumental  variables.    I  also  formally  test  the  model  for  over‐
identification in the reported results below. 
All estimation for these as well as subsequent models (unless otherwise stated) is done with 
robust  Huber‐White  standard  errors,  and  clustered  around  industry  to  minimize  serial 
correlation. 
BASELINE RESULTS 
In Table 4,  I  first  report  in model  (1) a  fixed effects  regression of LOGINVENTORYcfi,t+1 on 
LOGINFRASTRUCTUREct,  as  measured  using  LOGAIRct.    As  expected,  this  model  shows  a 
strong substitution effect: doubling the tonnage flown (in million tons per km flown within and 
                                                     




inventory  in  the  average  firm  by  9%.    The  corresponding  reduction  in  the  balance  sheet 
translates to 10% improvement in ROA.4  Since the median ROA for firms in my dataset is 8% 
(Table  2,  panel  (a)),  this  is  a  respectable  improvement    Given  the  much  wider  disparity  in 
infrastructure—considering say,  the UK’s 1.52 km/sq km  in  roads—it does seem  like  firms  in 
countries with poor  infrastructure do suffer by holding considerably more  inventory.   The co‐
determination  hypothesis meets  a  double  blow:  LOGGDPGROWTHct  is  not  significant while 
LOGINFRASTRUCTUREct continues to be so. 
The control variables are signed as predicted.   For example, Gaur, et al.  (2005) report  that 
the signs for LOGGMcift, LOGCAPINTENSITYcift, and LOGREVGROWTHcift are positive, negative, 




In  model  (3),  I  use  LOGROADSct  as  a  measure  of  LOGINFRASTRUCTUREct,  with 
qualitatively the same result.  The interpretation is that a doubling of LOGROADSct—roughly as 
in Malaysia’s 0.20 km/sq km to Turkey’s 0.45—reduces firm‐level inventory by about 9%.  Recall 





4. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 










Once  again,  LOGROADSct  is  signed  negative,  so  substitution  holds.    I  also  use  secondary 
industry codes, beyond the primary industries in the baseline.  The result is unchanged. 
In model  (3),  I  restrict  the  dataset  to  smaller  countries.    Recall  that  the  baseline  dataset 
includes countries with geographic area 400,000 square km or smaller and with GDP per capita 









case,  I  add  to  the  baseline  restriction  a  further  restriction  that  firms must  be  listed.   As  the 
results  show,  the  substitution  theory holds  again.   Other  sub‐samples  include MNCs,  stand‐




year periods  in  the  baseline.   This  accounts  for  the possibility  that  changes  in  infrastructure 
exhibit  long  lags.   Yet another  test  interacts LOGGDPGROWTH with LOGROADS,  to address 
the possibility  that GDP growth affects  the  impact of  infrastructure differently depending on 
the  level of  infrastructure.   Finally,  I also  include  the numerous controls  in Table 2, panel  (g), 
under  the  categories  “Macroeconomics,”  “Financial Constraints,”  “Openness,”  “Rule  of  Law 
and  Governance,”  and  “Technology.”    All  these  produce  qualitatively  the  same  result, 
supporting the substitution hypothesis and are not reported (but are available from the author). 





experience no substitution because more  roads  leads  to so much utilization  that  firms do not 
benefit  from  more  infrastructure?    First,  I  confirm  that  new  roads  generally  do  increase 
utilization, measured with LOGVEHICLES, log of the number of vehicles per km of roads.  The 
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correlation between LOGROADS and LOGVEHICLES  is 0.55.    In Table 6, models  (1),  I see  the 
LOGVEHICLES does not  influence the  inventory, whether on  its own or  in  its  interaction with 
LOGROADS.   One  interpretation  is  that utilization does not have  a  contingent  effect  on  our 
substitution hypothesis.   But an F‐test of LOGROADS and LOGVEHICLES  confirms  that  they 
are  jointly significant at the 1% level.  So perhaps it is the specification that is inadequate.  We 
address  this  in model (2) by  including a quadratic  term for LOGVEHICLES and  its  interaction 





held  by  minority  interests.    The  idea  is  that,  with  concentrated  owners,  the  majority 
shareholders  have  more  incentive  to  monitor  management,  and  in  many  cases,  they  are 
management themselves (e.g., La Porta, et al. (1999a), Morck, et al. (1988)).  In Table 6, model (3), 
I report estimations including a MINORITY variable (reported earlier in Table 2, panel (a)) and 









6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 




all  others  constant.    Since  “all  others”  are  rarely  constant,  observed differences  in  firm‐level 
inventory may not be attributable  to differences  in  infrastructure  in  the magnitude described 
here.   Another qualifier  is  that  I have not  investigated  the cost of  infrastructure, but only  the 
(partial)  benefit.   Nevertheless,  it  is  still  quite  astonishing  that  the  partial  differential  in  the 
substitution theory is as high as it is. 
In  this  paper,  I  focus  on  infrastructure  that  is  mostly  government  led.    One  interesting 
empirical  push  beyond  this  paper  is  to  investigate  interesting  private‐led  infrastructure 
developments,  such  as  phone  networks,  freight  hubs,  and  industrial  warehouse  facilities.  
Indeed,  the  benefit  is  probably  so  large  that  one  often  reads  about  private  firms  in 
infrastructure‐poor countries building or contributing to building infrastructure.  For example, 
Infosys and Wipro have  contributed Rs 1 billion  toward  the Rs 4.5 billion needed  to build a 
four‐lane flyover from Hosur Road to Electronic City (Rediff (2005)). 
On  a  theoretical  front,  it would  be  interesting  to  investigate  the  interface  between  other 
aspects of operations management beyond  inventory management—such  as  facility  locations 
and  supply  chain  contracting—that  might  also  be  affected  by  public  infrastructure  and 
institutions.    Practically,  this  paper  does  not  immediately  suggest  that  governments  start 
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(a) – Competing Hypotheses to Explain Negative Relationship between Infrastructure and Inventory 
 
All hypotheses hold as constant both relevant time-invariant and time-varying firm characteristics, industry 
characteristics, and country characteristics like inflation and interest rates, quality of institutions, etc.  Importantly, the 
hypotheses hold each other constant.  For example, “substitution” says we should observe “more infrastructure, less 








Substitution (baseline) More infrastructure, less 
inventory 
Infrastructure reduces 
supply chain lead time 
and demand volatility – 
e.g., less need for 
customers to bulk-
purchase 
Chikan and Whybark 
(1990), Guasch and 
Kogan (2004) 
Public finance Less inventory, more 
infrastructure  
Low-inventory firms are 
better performing, and pay 
more taxes, that provide 
for more infrastructure 
Chen, et al. (2005), 
Demsetz (1973), Gaur, et 
al. (1999), Lai (2005) 
Co-determination Ambiguous , spurious 
relationship  
Both are co-determined 
by GDP growth 
Chikan and Whybark 
(1990), Glaeser, et al. 
(2004) 
 
(b) – Cross-sectional Contingencies 
 
These ask: even if there is substitution for the average country or average firm, wouldn’t some countries or some 








Utilization in a country Substitution only if 
utilization does not 
increase “too much” 
Greater utilization is 
evidence of “increasing 
returns” to infrastructure, 
and reduces need for 
inventory.  But too high 
utilization is evidence of 
traffic jams, which 




Agency in a firm Substitution only if agency 
issues are not too serious 
Firms with agency issues 
(e.g., diversified 
ownership) have 
managers who spend less 
effort on minimizing 
inventory, especially if the 
effort is only noisily 
revealed through financial 
performance 
Berle and Means (1932), 





(a) – Firm-year Observations 
 
The data is for all retail (NAICS 2000 code 44 through 45) firms from Osiris and COMPUSTAT Global Vantage tapes.  
Each observation is a firm-year.  There are 4,268 unique firms from 60 countries.  The period covered is 1983 
through 2004.  All values are in millions of nominal U.S. dollars, at current exchange rates for non-US firms.  
Inventory values are scaled by cost of goods sold.  Variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
 
 N Median Std. dev. 
Year 28,229 1,999 4.64 
Inventory – total 28,229 0.15 0.26 
Inventory – raw materials 8,328 0.01 0.11 
Inventory – WIP (work in progress) 6,782 0.001 0.09 
Inventory – finished goods 10,857 0.13 0.25 
Levered free cash flow margin 24,914 0.04 0.45 
COGS (cost of goods sold) 28,229 360.06 50,694.93 
Market capitalization 9,647 161.19 4,062.53 
Assets 19,228 169.47 3,459.51 
Gross margin 28,226 0.17 0.27 
ROE 25,985 0.50 658.57 
ROA 26,601 0.08 0.19 
Revenue growth 21,630 0.08 5,544.62 
Common stock 18,725 7.25 131.91 
Tobin’s q 3,798 1.66 1.56 
Minority interest (ratio of shares) 6,477 0.04 0.31 
Number of subsidiaries 19,228 2.00 45.12 
 
(b) Observations by Country and Year 
 
  N   N   N   N 
1 Argentina 8 16 Germany 114 31 Mauritius 1 46 Singapore 318 
2 Australia 194 17 Greece 168 32 Mexico 270 47 Slovenia 19 
3 Austria 3 18 Hong Kong 1,000 33 Namibia 2 48 South Africa 198 
4 Bahrain 16 19 Hungary 10 34 Netherlands 308 49 Sri Lanka 65 
5 Belgium 33 20 Iceland 4 35 Norway 3 50 Sweden 218 
6 Brazil 44 21 Indonesia 184 36 Occ Palestine 1 51 Switzerland 52 
7 Canada 544 22 Ireland 153 37 Oman 34 52 Taiwan 220 
8 Chile 42 23 Israel 55 38 Pakistan 6 53 Thailand 189 
9 China 717 24 Japan 8,456 39 Peru 33 54 Turkey 101 
10 Colombia 25 25 Jordan 17 40 Philippines 54 55 UAE 9 
11 Denmark 182 26 Korea, Rep. 496 41 Poland 7 56 UK 3,755 
12 Egypt 180 27 Kuwait 5 42 Portugal 7 57 USA 9,130 
13 Estonia 5 28 Latvia 24 43 Qatar 3 58 Venezuela 2 
14 Finland 20 29 Lithuania 7 44 Russia 7 59 Vietnam 19 
15 France 76 30 Malaysia 393 45 Saudi Arabia 19 60 Zimbabwe 4 
 
(c) – Firm-years by Listing Status 
 
 N % 
Listed 20,891 74.0 
Delisted  3,315 11.7 
Unlisted 4,023 14.3 
Total 28,229 100.0 
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(d) – Cost Accounting Treatment 
 
 N % 
Current Cost 11 0.10 
Historic Cost(company does not revalue fixed assets) 8,444 78.77 
Modified Historic Cost(company states assets at cost in its statements but assumes 
replacement cost for depreciation) 
2,265 21.13 
 10,720 100.0 
 
(e) – Distribution by Inventory Accounting Method 
 
 N. % 
First In, First Out (FIFO) 2320 38.27 
Last In, First Out (LIFO) 811 13.39 
Specific Identification 287 4.73 
Average Cost 1460 24.09 
Retail Method (See note below) 124 2.03 
Standard Cost 989 16.32 
Current or Replacement Cost 59 0.97 
No Inventory or information 14 0.23 
Total 6064 100.00 
 
(f) – Accounting Standards 
 
 N % 
Domestic standards generally in accordance with IASC guidelines  151 1.41 
Domestic standards generally in accordance with OECD guidelines  1 0.01 
Domestic standards  10,485 97.76 
Domestic standards in accordance with principles generally accepted in the United States and 
generally in accordance with IASC and OECD guidelines  6 0.06 
Domestic standards in accordance with principles generally accepted in the United States   23 0.21 
Modified US standards (Japanese companies' financial statements translated into English)  42 0.39 
United States' standards  17 0.16 




(g) – Country-year Information: Time-Varying 
 
The data is from WDI.  To keep this paper of reasonable length, I refer readers to the World Bank’s “Country Data 




 Variable N Med SD 
Macroeconomics     
GDP, PPP (constant 2000 international bil $) GDP 4856 27.6 3830 
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 international $) GDPCAPITA 4856 4620.5 8203.4 
GDP growth (annual %) GDPGROWTH 5279 3.53 6.30 
Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) INTEREST 4745 7.1 588.2 
Real interest rate (%) TAX 3334 6.2 20.6 
Highest marginal tax rate, corporate rate (%) SERVICES 658 30.0 9.5 
Services, etc., value added (% of GDP)  4661 51.4 13.0 
Financial constraints     
Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of GDP) CREDIT 4794 45.3 55.7 
Finance (% of mgrs ranking this as major constraint) FINANCE 49 27.9 17.3 
Market capitalization of listed companies (% of GDP) MKTCAP 1658 27.0 53.4 
Business disclosure index (0=less to 7=more) DISCLOSURE 153 3.0 1.9 
Legal rights of borrowers & lenders index (0=least to 10=most) RIGHTS 142 5.0 2.0 
Openness     
Trade in goods (% of GDP) TRADEGDP 4799 51.5 52.4 
Foreign direct invest., net inflows (% of gross capital formation) FDI 4412 4.3 50.1 
Customs and other import duties (% of tax revenue) CUSTOMS 970 16.2 16.9 
Rule of Law and Governance     
Corruption (% of mgrs ranking this as major constraint) CORRUPTION 49 31.4 19.2 
Courts (% of mgrs not confidence courts uphold property rights) COURTSCONFI 47 47.1 14.8 
Courts (% of mgrs ranking this as a major constraint) COURTSCONSTR 37 15.7 10.5 
Time to enforce a contract (days) CONTRACTTIME 160 360.0 215.3 
Procedures to enforce a contract CONTRACTPROC 160 29.0 10.6 
Management time dealing with officials (% of management time) MGT_TIME 47 11.0 3.8 
Policy uncertainty (% of mgrs ranking this as major constraint) UNCERTAINTY 48 39.7 16.0 
Technology     
Internet users (per 1,000 people) INTERNET 2311 3.9 102.7 
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 people) PHONE 5648 62.5 278.8 
Information and comm.. tech expenditure per capita (US$) TECHPERCAP 276 261.0 832.8 
Computer, comm. and other services (% of commercial service imports)TECHIMPORTS 4460 25.8 15.4 
Infrastructure     
Air transport, freight (million tons per km) AIR 4402 31.5 8,691.8 
Container port traffic (mil TEU: 20 foot equivalent units) PORT 280 2.0 41.3 
Roads, total network (thousand km) ROADS 2108 42.2 2,564.7 
Roads, paved (% of total roads) ROADSPAVED 1959 48.3 33.2 
Roads, goods transported (million ton-km) ROADSGOODS 626 10,525.5 167,658.6
Vehicles (per km of road) VEHICLES 1337 16.0 45.9 
Railways, good hauled (bil ton-km) RAILWAYS 102 3.77 303 
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(h) – Country Information: Time-Constant 
 
The data is as of year 2000.  The data is courtesy of CIESIN (Center for International Earth Science Information 
Network) at Columbia.  “Total area” is area in square kilometers from World Bank (1997), except for Taiwan and 
Mexico from CIA (1997), with submerged land subtracted out.  “Landlocked indicator” is 1 for landlocked country, 
excluding countries in Western and Central Europe (Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Slovakia, and Switzerland), and includes Eastern European countries of Belarus and 
Moldova.  “Island indicator” is 1 if the country is linked to another country only via a man-made connection.  “Air 
distance from New York/Tokyo/Rotterdam” is the log of the minimum Great-Circle (air) distance in kilometers to one 
of the three capital-goods-supplying regions: the U.S., Western Europe, and Japan, specifically measured as 
distance from the country’s capital city to New York, Rotterdam, or Tokyo.  “Mean elevation” is calculated in 
geographic projection.  “Mean distance from coast or river (km)” is distance from the nearest sea-navigable rivers and 
ice-free coastline calculated in Plate Caree projection.   
 
 Variable N Med Std dev. 
Total area (sq. km) TOTALAREA 208 109,875 1,861,384 
Landlocked indicator LANDLOCKED 208 0.20 (mean) 0.40 
Island indicator ISLAND 208 0.25 (mean) 0.43 
Mean elevation (m) ELEVATION 159 442 565 
Air distance from New York/Tokyo/Rotterdam (km) DISTANCE_AIR 149 4,160 2,430 
Mean distance from coast or river (km) DISTANCE_COAST 159 141 472 
 
(i) – Sub-samples 
 
The baseline dataset focuses on geographically small countries (total area less than 400,000 square km) or countries 
with well-developed infrastructure (GDP per capita at US$20,000 or above, at purchasing power parity PPP, in the 
firm-year).  The idea for the latter is that, unlike say China, more developed countries like the U.S. allow American 
firms in any part of the country to take advantage of its average infrastructure.  The other sub-samples are used for 
robustness tests. 
 
Area<400,000 sq km or GDP/capita 
> $20,000/year 
Area<100,000 sq km or GDP/capita 
> $20,000/year 
Area<100,000 sq km 
Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hong 
Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, 
Israel, Japan, Jordan, Korea, Rep., 
Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, 
Mauritius, Netherlands, Norway, 
Oman, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, 
Qatar, Singapore, Slovenia, Sri 
Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, 
United States, Vietnam, Zimbabwe 
Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hong 
Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, 
Israel, Japan, Jordan, Korea, Rep., 
Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Mauritius, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Qatar, Singapore, Slovenia, Sri 
Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, 
United States 
Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Denmark, 
Estonia, Hong Kong, Hungary, 
Ireland, Israel, Jordan, Korea, Rep., 
Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Mauritius, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Qatar, 
Singapore, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, 
Switzerland, United Arab Emirates 
 
Table 3 – Correlation between Instrumental and Endogenous Variables 
This is for the sub-sample “Area<400,000 sq km or GDP/capita > $20,000/year” used in the rest of the paper. 
 LOGROADS 
LOGROADS_ 
PAVED LOGRAILWAY LOGPORT LOGAIR LOGVEHICLES
LOGTOTAREA 0.54 -0.93 0.53 -0.57 -0.72 -0.80 
ISLAND -0.09 0.51 -0.28 0.71 0.09 0.25 
LANDLOCKED -0.11 . 0.06 0.01 -0.04 -0.02 
LOGELEV 0.59 -0.46 0.28 -0.30 -0.64 -0.32 
LOGAIRDIST -0.61 0.22 -0.64 -0.25 0.20 0.32 





Models (1) and (2) are use firm fixed effects:  
LOGINVENTORYcif,t+1 = LOGINFRASTRUCTUREct + LOGGDPGROWTHct + Fcift + Cct + FIRMf + εcift , 
where LOGINVENTORYcif,t+1 is the aggregate inventory for firm f in country c in year t+1, scaled by contemporaneous 
cost of goods sold, LOGINFRASTRUCTUREcift is a measure of some element of country c’s infrastructure in year t 
scaled by the country’s area, and LOGGDPGROWTHct  a measure of country c’s GDP growth in year t..  Fcift  and Cct 
are vectors of firm and country control variables, FIRMf are firm effects, and εft is assumed to be white.  In the other 
models, LOGINFRASTRUCTUREct is estimated with country time-invariant instruments, and uses 2-stage least 
squares, naturally without the firm fixed effects.  The dataset includes only firm-years from geographically small 
countries (total area less than 400,000 square km) or countries with well-developed infrastructure (PPP GDP per 
capita at US$20,000 or above, in the firm-year).  Estimation is done with robust Huber-White standard errors, and 
clustered around industry to minimize serial correlation.  *** = 1% significance, ** = 5%, *=10%.  OLS = fixed effects, 









LOGINFRASTRUCTURE    
LOGAIR -.07 (.04)* -.07 (.03)***  
LOGROADS   -.09 (.04)** 
LOGGDPGROWTH .01 (.01) -.02 (.01) -.02 (.01)** 
Fcft     
LOGGM .35 (.04)*** .82 (.04)*** .79 (.03)*** 
LOGCAPINTENSITY -.18 (.04)*** -.56 (.03)*** -.61 (.04)*** 
LOGREVGROWTH -.01 (.01) .00 (.00)*** .00 (.00)*** 
Cct    
LOGINFLATION -.01 (.01) .04 (.02) .01 (.03) 
LOGINTEREST .02 (.01) .03 (.02) -.03 (.04) 
LOGGDPCAPITA .38 (.19)** .17 (.11) -.22 (.10)** 
LOGPHONE -.21 (.07)*** -.20 (.05)*** -.03 (.11) 
Intercept -3.24 (1.49)** -.87 (.80) 1.59 (.73)** 
Over-identification test (p-value) - .00 .00 
N 7727 7698 9979 
Adj R-squared .88 .45 .44 
F on LOGINFRASTRUCTURE 2.9 9.8 6.7 




The model, estimated using instrumental variables, is:  
LOGINVENTORYcif,t+1 = LOGINFRASTRUCTUREct + Fcift + Cct + INDUSTRYi + YEARt + εcift , 
where INVENTORYcif,t+1 is the aggregate inventory for firm f in country c in year t+1, scaled by contemporaneous cost 
of goods sold, INFRASTRUCTUREcift is a measure of some element of country c’s infrastructure in year t, Fcift  and 
Cct are matrices of firm and country control variables, INDUSTRYi and YEARt are (2-digit NAICS, except in model 2) 
industry and year effects, and εft is assumed to be white..  Models (1) and (2) include only firm-years from 
geographically small countries (total area less than 400,000 square km) or countries with well-developed 
infrastructure (PPP GDP per capita at US$20,000 or above, in the firm-year).  Model (3) changes the 400,000 square 
km restriction to 100,000 square km.  Model (4) excludes firm-years for the USA.  Model (5) restricts the baseline 
dataset further, to include only listed firms. 
Estimation is done with robust Huber-White standard errors, and clustered around industry to minimize serial 














Variables of interest      
LOGINFRASTRUCTURE      
LOGROADS -.24 (.09)*** -.11 (.03)*** -.12 (.03)*** -.07 (.04)* -.12 (.05)*** 
LOGROADSPAVED .38 (.24)     
LOGAIR -.03 (.04)     
LOGGDPGROWTH -.01 (.01) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) -.02 (.01)* -.02 (.01)* 
Fcft       
LOGGM .79 (.04)*** .64 (.04)*** .66 (.04)*** .68 (.05)*** .82 (.04)*** 
LOGCAPINTENSITY -.61 (.04)*** -.44 (.04)*** -.44 (.04)*** -.79 (.07)*** -.58 (.05)*** 
LOGREVGROWTH .00 (.00)*** .00 (.00)*** .00 (.00)*** -.03 (.02) -.0003 (.00)***
Cct      
LOGINFLATION -.05 (.04) .03 (.02) .02 (.02) .05 (.03) -.02 (.03) 
LOGINTEREST -.07 (.04)* .00 (.02) .00 (.02) .04 (.05) -.06 (.05) 
LOGGDPCAPITA .16 (.17) -.02 (.08) -.03 (.12) .04 (.17) -.21 (.11)** 
LOGPHONE -.34 (.16)** -.20 (.05)*** -.23 (.05)*** -.20 (.15) -.02 (.12) 
Intercept -1.60 (2.08) .72 (.68) .16 (1.01) -.41 (1.02) 1.29 (.78)* 
Over-identification test (p-value) .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
N 9667 9979 9771 3257 7490 
Adj R-squared .44 .59 .60 .43 .44 
F on country-infrastructure 6.62 15.1 15.23 3.38 6.39 




The model, estimated using instrumental variables, is:  
LOGINVENTORYcif,t+1 = LOGINFRASTRUCTUREct + Contingenciescift + Fcift + Cct + INDUSTRYi + YEARt + εcift , 
where Contingenciescift are the contingency variables below.  Road utilization is measured with LOGVEHICLES is 
the log of the number of vehicles per km of roads.  Agency is measured with MINORITY, the ratio of shares owned by 
minority shareholders.  Estimation is done with robust Huber-White standard errors, and clustered around industry to 
minimize serial correlation.  *** = 1% significance, ** = 5%, *=10%. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables of interest    
LOGROADS -.25 (.20) .02 (1.27) -.08 (.05)* 
LOGGDPGROWTH -.02 (.01)* -.01 (.01) -.01 (.01) 
Contingenciescift    
LOGVEHICLES -.05 (.06) 1.46 (.57)**  
LOGVEHICLES x LOGROADS .05 (.06) -.21 (.08)**  
LOGVEHICLESSQ  -.15 (.79)  
LOGVEHICLESSQ x LOGROADS  .04 (.12)  
MINORITY   .01 (.00)*** 
MINORITY x LOGROADS   .02 (.00)*** 
Fcft    
LOGGM .79 (.04)*** .78 (.04)*** .71 (.06)*** 
LOGCAPINTENSITY -.61 (.04)*** -.60 (.04)*** -.58 (.07)*** 
LOGREVGROWTH .00 (.00)*** .00 (.00)*** -.01 (.00)** 
Cct    
LOGINFLATION .02 (.03) .04 (.03) .05 (.03) 
LOGINTEREST -.02 (.04) .00 (.04) .07 (.06) 
LOGGDPCAPITA -.26 (.11)** -.48 (.13)*** .16 (.15) 
LOGPHONE .00 (.12) .04 (.12) -.24 (.16) 
Intercept 1.98 (.87)** 1.22 (.97) -1.34 (.89) 
N 9972 9972 1996 




The data is for all retail (NAICS 2000 code 44 through 45) firms from Osiris and COMPUSTAT Global Vantage tapes.  
Each observation is a firm-year.  There are 4,268 unique firms from 60 countries.  The period covered is 1983 
through 2004.  All values are in millions of nominal U.S. dollars, at current exchange rates for non-US firms.  
Inventory values are scaled by cost of goods sold.  Roads/area for each country is road length divided by area.  It is 
obtained from WDI. 
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